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.  .  . the  majority  of  Americans  have  come  to  be  completely  divorced  from  the  land  and, 
as a result,  the  general  public  understanding  of  agriculture  and  its problems  has  declined. 
Even  American  farmers  themselves,  driven  by  the  daily  necessities  of  making  both  ends 
meet  and  bewildered  by  the  growing  complexity  of  their  individual  lives,  have  found  it 
increasingly  difficult  to  comprehend  and  deal  with  the  collective  problems  of  American 
agriculture.  .  .  .  Strangely,  however,  no  adequate  attempt  seems  to  have  been  made  to 
give  the  general  public  an  impartial,  over-all  picture  of  the  vast  governmental  operations 
in  the  field  of  agriculture  and  of  their  cause  and  effects. 
Evans  Clark 
Farm  Policies of the  United States,  1790-I  950 
These  words,  written  in  1953,  are  as  applicable 
today  as  they  were  34  years  ago.  As  then,  the 
problems  facing  agriculture  today  are  complex  and 
daunting.  Government  spending  on agricultural  pro- 
grams  has  increased  dramatically  since  1985;  yet 
many  farmers  remain  in financial  difficulty.  Also  it 
still  remains  difficult  for  the  average  American  to 
understand  present  policy  and its relationship  to con- 
temporary  farm  problems.  As  an  aid  to  under- 
standing,  this  article  sketches  the  historical  develop- 
ment  of  United  States  agricultural  policy.  Special 
emphasis  is  placed  on  policy  developments  since 
1930  as  these  developments  make  up  the  foun- 
dation  of  the  present  agricultural  policy.  As  a 
preliminary,  however,  the  first few paragraphs  below 
highlight  the  chief  policy  issues  of the  period  1800 
to  1930. 
HISTORY  OF AGRICULTURAL  POLICY 
In  the  broadest  sense,  agricultural  policy  is  any 
government  policy  that  affects  the  decisions  of the 
agricultural  industry  regarding  investment,  produc- 
tion,  pricing,  or  distribution.  Since  the  original 
economy  of the  United  States  was almost  exclusively 
agrarian,  much  of the  early  economic  and trade  policy 
was  effectively  agricultural  policy.  Thus,  in  the 
early  federal  period,  whenever  the  federal  govern- 
ment  responded  to  the  problems  and  needs  of  the 
economy,  it  was  creating  agricultural  policy. 
Pre-Civil  War 
In  the  early  1800s  economic  policy  and  hence, 
agricultural  policy,  stressed  expansion  and  develop- 
ment.  The  United  States  possessed  large  amounts 
of  undeveloped  land  that  people  were  eager  to 
settle  and farm.  Early  federal  legislation  was directed 
toward  accommodating  those  wishing  to  farm  the 
lands.  With  the  rise  of nonfarm  economic  interests 
in  the  early  to  mid-1800s  however,  national 
economic  policy  became  less  accommodative  to 
agricultural  interests.  Congress  erected  tariffs  on 
imported  finished  goods  to  protect  the  emerging 
domestic  manufacturing  industry.  These  tariffs, 
however,  hurt  farmers,  who  sold on the  open  market 
and  wished  to  buy  finished  goods  as  cheaply  as 
possible. 
Congress  also  attempted  to  develop  a stable  cur- 
rency  and payments  mechanism  in the  United  States 
in the  early  to  mid-1800s.  A dependable  payments 
system  was held  to be a prerequisite  for the  develop- 
ment  of commerce  within  the  United  States  and with 
foreign  nations,  particularly  those  of  Europe.  The 
most  notable  of  the  attempts  to  improve  the 
payments  mechanism  were  Congressional  efforts  to 
establish  a lasting  central  bank.  Farmers  who  were 
normally  indebted  opposed  such  institutions  because 
they  perceived  that  they  would  pursue  “hard  money” 
policies. 
Although  agricultural  interests  were,  to  some 
extent,  overshadowed  by  those  of  other  economic 
sectors  by  the  mid-1800s  interest  in  agricultural 
FEDERAL  RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND  39 policy  always  revived  when  agriculture  experienced 
economic  downturns.  Those  downturns  usually 
followed  periods  of high prices  for farm commodities. 
When  prices  fell  at  the  end  of the  booms,  farm  in- 
comes  dropped  and farmers  usually  sought  help  from 
the  Congress.  Such  an episode  in the  late  1850s  led 
to  the  establishment  of  the  United  States  Depart- 
ment  of Agriculture  (USDA),  which  was charged  with 
assisting  farmers  to  produce  more  efficiently. 
Post-Civil  War 
The  Civil  War  arguably  exerted  a larger  influence 
on agriculture  than  any other  event  in the  nineteenth 
century.  High  prices  and  scarce  manpower  during 
the  war  years  induced  the  development  and 
adoption  of  technology  that  substantially  boosted 
farm  productivity.  Further,  westward  expansion  in 
the  postwar  period  brought  substantial  increases  in 
the  amount  of  land  being  settled  and  farmed.  Not 
surprisingly,  agricultural  production  outpaced  demand 
and  prices  dropped. 
Farmers  pressed  for legislation  that  would,  in their 
view,  increase  the  prices  they  received.  Control  of 
warehouse  and  shipping  rates  and  cooperative 
marketing  arrangements  were  areas  where  legislation 
was  sought.  Farmers  thought  they  would  receive 
higher  net  prices  if  they  could  eliminate  the 
middleman,  but  their  efforts  to  gain  control  over 
marketing  proved  unsuccessful  and  prices  showed 
little  change.  Farmers  also  sought  legislation 
promoting  inflation  in  order  to  lessen  their  debt 
burden.  These  efforts  were  also  fruitless. 
With  the  beginning  of the  twentieth  century,  farm 
incomes  improved  dramatically.  The  end  of western 
settlement  caused  slower  growth  in farm  output  while 
the  United  States  population  and the  demand  for food 
continued  to grow.  Farmland  prices  rose  with  the  im- 
proved  farm  income  prospects,  which  led to a greater 
demand  for  credit  to  purchase  farms. 
Congress  responded  with  the  establishment  of  the 
farm  land  bank  system.  The  Federal  Land  Bank 
System,  established  in  1916,  was  a  cooperative 
system  of  twelve  regional  banks  whose  purpose 
was  to  raise  private  capital  to  provide  credit  to 
agriculture. 
World  War  I generated  a strong  demand  for food. 
Seeking  to  secure  adequate  supplies  of food  for  our 
European  allies,  the  federal  government  intervened 
in  agricultural  markets  by  entering  into  marketing 
agreements  with  domestic  agricultural  producers  and 
setting  guaranteed  prices  for hogs and wheat.  Farmers 
responded  with  increased  production.  This  inter- 
vention-the  first  of many-proved  in retrospect  to 
be  quite  important.  It was  the  first  time  the  federal 
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government  entered  the  domestic  agricultural  market 
as  a  consumer  on  a  large  scale. 
Post-World  War  I 
War  demand  created  relatively  high  agricultural 
prices  that  encouraged  expansion  of agricultural  pro- 
duction  in  both  the  United  States  and  Europe.  As 
foreign  production  increased,  however,  demand  for 
American  products  in Europe  decreased,  and  world 
prices  dropped  sharply  after  peaking  in early  1920. 
Although  prices  rose  somewhat  throughout  the 
remainder  of the  decade,  American  farmers  did  not 
regain  their  wartime  prosperity. 
The  end  of  the  1920s  saw  a  sharp  economic 
downturn.  The  stock  market  crash  of  19’29,  tight 
money,  and  sharply  lower  farm  prices  adversely 
affected  the  agricultural  sector.  The  stock  market 
crash  ended  the  urban  prosperity  of the  1920s  and 
weakened  domestic  demand  for agricultural  products. 
Tight  money  caused  many  banks  and insurance  com- 
panies  to  seek  new  sources  of liquidity.  One  way  for 
them  to  increase  their  liquidity  was  to  stop  rolling 
over  or refinancing  farm  mortgages.  In the  late  1920s 
and  early  1930s  many  farm  mortgages  of the  period 
were  of a very  short  term,  often  three  years  or less, 
and  were  regularly  rolled  over  at expiration.  Due  to 
low  farm  prices  and  a bleak  outlook  for  the  sector, 
many  agricultural  loans  were  not  rolled  over  in  the 
early  1930s. 
The  1930s 
As the  1930s  began,  farmers  sought  federal  legis- 
lation  to maintain  the  “fair” price  levels  of the  1920s 
and  to  provide  adequate  credit.  Congress  re- 
sponded  by considering  a number  of policies  designed 
to support  farm  income.  Congressional  consideration 
concluded  in the  passage  of the  Agricultural  Adjust- 
ment  Act  of  1933  (AAA)  on  May  12,  1933. 
The  AAA  recognized  that  low  agricultural  prices 
were  the  result  of domestic  oversupply.  Given  this, 
higher  farm prices  could  be achieved  via three  routes. 
First,  production  could  be  limited  (see  Box  1); 
second,  consumption  could  be  increased  by  sub- 
sidizing  food  for  lower  income  groups;  and  third, 
consumption  could  be  raised  by  raising  aggregate 
incomes.  AAA  followed  the  first  and  third  paths. 
To  limit  production,  AAA  allowed  the  federal 
government  to enter  into  voluntary  agreements  with 
farmers  who  would  reduce  their  planted  acreage  of 
crops  that  were  in surplus.  Farmers  who  met  acreage 
reduction  requirements  were  offered  benefit 
payments  or supplementary  income.  Payments  were 
in the  form  of rent  on the  acreage  left  out  of produc- tion.  To  pay  for  the  output  reduction  programs,  a 
processing  tax  was  levied  on  the  appropriate 
commodities. 
To  increase  consumption,  the  government  sought 
to  raise  employment  levels  and  per  capita  incomes. 
Several  programs  were  enacted  to put people  to work, 
often  on  government-sponsored  projects.  Although 
national  income  rose,  it is not  clear  that  this increase 
perceptibly  boosted  demand  for agricultural products. 
Congress  also  sought  to  make  “adequate”  credit 
available to the farm sector.  Since  Colonial  days credit 
availability  had  been  a concern  of  the  farm  sector. 
In the  1930s  farmers  felt that long-term  credit,  which 
they  used  to  purchase  and  improve  farmland,  was 
difficult to obtain.  Further,  farmers  needed  more  flex- 
ibility  in  repayment  terms  because  drought  years 
hampered  their  ability  to  service  debt. 
On March  27,  1933,  in response  to these  concerns, 
President  Roosevelt,  acting  on  authority  granted  by 
Congress,  issued  an order  to  reorganize  the  various 
farm credit  agencies  then  in existence  into one  unified 
body  called  the  Farm  Credit  Administration  (FCA). 
This  organization  provided  emergency  refinancing 
of long-term  farm  debt. Later  Congress  passed  the 
Emergency  Farm  Mortgage  Act and the  Farm  Credit 
Act. 
The  Emergency  Farm  Mortgage  Act  provided 
authorization  to  raise  $2  billion  (backed  by  bonds 
that  were  to  be  guaranteed  by  the  federal  govern- 
ment)  to refinance  non-land  bank  loans.  The  act fur- 
ther  specified  that  existing  and  new  land  bank  loan 
rates  be  reduced  to  4.5  percent  from  the  prevailing 
rate  of 5.4  percent  and that  repayment  schedules  be 
“stretched  out”  when  the  weak  financial  condition 
of  farmers  dictated  this  to  be  necessary.  The  Act, 
as its  name  implies,  was  intended  to  be  temporary 
assistance  to  farmers  in  adjusting  to  the  depressed 
economic  conditions  of  the  period. 
A second  piece  of legislation,  the  Farm  Credit  Act 
of  1933,  was passed  on June  16,  1933.  The  act was 
intended  to provide  a long-term  solution  to problems 
associated  with  farm  debt.  Specifically,  it combined 
existing  credit  agencies  with  new  ones  to  form  the 
Farm  Credit  Administration.  The  system  consisted 
of four  segments  that  were  equipped  to provide  long- 
term,  intermediate-term,  and  short-term  credit  to 
farmers.  The  system  still  operates  today. 
The  AAA  of  1933  was  amended  in  1938  to 
establish  loans  to farmers  at harvest  using  their  crops 
as collateral,  acreage  allotments,  market  quotas  for 
some  commodities,  and  maintenance  of  prices  in 
some  prescribed  ratio  to  those  existing  in  the  pre- 
World  War  I period. 
Between  1940  and  1945,  World  War  II strength- 
ened  prices  for agricultural  products.  As with previous 
war-related  booms,  however,  the  postwar  years  saw 
surpluses  and  a  downturn  in  the  farm  sector. 
Post-World  War  II 
The  postwar  era  was  characterized  by  farm  com- 
modity  surplus.  High  prices  and  access  to  produc- 
tion  technology  rapidly  expanded  farm  output  in the 
late  1940s.  The  surge  in output  exceeded  growth  in 
demand,  pushing  prices  down.  Many  farmers  went 
out  of  business. 
In this period,  agricultural  policy  was based  on the 
same  framework  as  in  1933.  Modifications  of  the 
1933  farm  bill were  passed  in the  late  1940s  195Os, 
and early  1960s.  Most  relied  on land retirement  plans 
in attempts  to  reduce  the  surpluses.  Rising  foreign 
sales finally reduced  the  surpluses  in the  early  1960s 
but  the  strong  sales  were  short-lived  and  com- 
modity  stocks  began  to  pile  up  again  late  in  the 
decade. 
RECENT  AGRICULTURAL  EXPERIENCE 
The  most  recent  agricultural  “boom  and  bust” 
cycle  began  in the early  1970s. The  boom  was caused 
by  the  combination  of small  world  stocks  of grains, 
strong  economic  growth,  and  relatively  abundant 
credit  worldwide.  The  price  of  grain  was  bid  up 
globally  as nations  sought  to  improve  their  dietary 
standards.  The  United  States,  which  held  a large por- 
tion  of  world  grain  stocks,  liquidated  those  stocks 
on  the  world  market.  The  strong  demand  and 
decreasing  stock  levels  raised  prices  and  caused 
agricultural  producers,  especially  in the  United  States, 
to invest  in more  efficient  production  techniques.  In- 
creased  capital  investment  in  farming  was  often 
funded  by  long-term  debt. 
As  agricultural  prices  moved  up,  federal  support 
prices  followed.  A  price  support  is  a  guaranteed 
minimum  or  floor  price:  at  that  price  the  federal 
government  will buy  whatever  the  market  will  not 
absorb.  Because  prices  could  fall only  as far  as the 
support  price,  farmers  were  willing  to  take  on  long- 
term  debt  to  finance  land  and  equipment  that  ex- 
panded  production. 
The  expansion  of  demand  enjoyed  by  farmers 
during  the  1970s  vanished  by  the  early  1980s.  The 
boom  ended  in  a  manner  similar  to  that  following 
World  War  I. With  world  prices  high  in the  197Os, 
many  nations  began  producing  more  of  their  own 
food  and  feed.  Adding  to  their  decision  to  do so in 
the  early  1980s  were  their  lower  income  prospects 
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DOMESTIC  AGRICULTURAL  POLICY 
Agricultural  policy  has historically  sought  to increase 
farm  income  by  increasing  gross  farm  receipts.  Gross 
farm  receipts  are  determined  by  the  quantity  of farm 
products  sold  multiplied  by  their  market  prices. 
Agricultural  policies  attempt  to  boost  receipts  by 
limiting  output  or  by  guaranteeing  farmers  a  higher 
price.  What  follows  explains  the  policies  in  terms  of 
supply  and  demand  for  a  representative  agricultural 
commodity. 
Output Constraints 
The  purpose  of  acreage  reduction  programs  and 
other  output  limitations  is to reduce  supplies  and  boost 
prices.  Acres  taken  out  of production  are  often  idled, 
leaving  them  unavailable  for  the  production  of  other 
crops.  As  shown  in  Figure  la,  a  decline  in  output 
rotates  the  commodity  supply  curve  to  the  left.  A 
perfect  output  control  mechanism  would  make  the 
curve  vertical  at  the  desired  output.  This  raises  the 
equilibrium  market  price  of the  commodity  from  P,  to 
Pz. Less  effective  output  control  mechanisms,  however, 
will shift  the  supply  curve  to a position  between  Sr and 
S, because  attempts  to limit  output  are in part  thwarted 
by  farmers  using  their  remaining  land  more  inten- 
sively. 
Because  the  quantity  of  farm  commodities  de- 
manded  is relatively  insensitive  (inelastic)  to  changes 
in price,  gross  farm  receipts  (price  times  quantity)  will 
be  higher  with  the  restrictions.  In  terms  of Figure  la, 
Figure  la 
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rectangle  a is greater  than  c + d,  so farmers  have  a net 
gain.  But  the  farmers’  gain  is  at  the  expense  of  con- 
sumers  who  now  pay  more  for  less,  so  a represents  a 
redistribution  of income  from  consumers  to  farmers. 
That  leaves  two  losses.  First,  triangle  b represents  the 
deadweight  loss,  that  is, potential  gains  to  consumers 
from  transactions  that  do not  take  place  due  to the  con- 
straints.  Second,  triangle  c represents  the  lost  benefits 
to  farmers  from  selling  more  at  a  lower  price. 
Guaranteed Price 
The  nonrecourse  loan  program  acts  as  a “floor”  to 
the  market  price.  The  government  lends  to the  farmer 
an  amount  equal  to  the  value  of  his  crop  at  the 
guaranteed  loan  price.  In  return,  the  farmer  puts  up 
the  crop  as  collateral.  If the  market  price  rises  above 
the  loan  price,  the  farmer  pays  back  the  loan  and  keeps 
the  rest.  If  market  price  is  below  the  loan  price,  the 
farmer  forfeits  the  crop  and  keeps  the  loan  amount. 
In  effect,  then,  under  such  a program  part  of the  crop 
is  “sold”  to  the  government. 
In  Figure  lb,  the  government  sets  a guaranteed  loan 
price  at  P,.  At  that  price,  farmers  produce  OQ3  units 
of which  OQ2  are  sold  on  the  market,  leaving  an  ex- 
cess  quantity  supplied  of QaQ3  to  be  absorbed  by  the 
government.  The  dotted  area represents  a transfer  from 
consumers  to farmers  due  to higher  prices.  The  shaded 
area  represents  government  expenditures  on  the  pro- 
gram,  which  are in part  offset  by the  value  of the  stocks 
they  have  accumulated.  The  government  is now  faced 
with  the  problem  of  eliminating  the  excess. 
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put  reduction  programs.  If they  are effective,  they  limit 
the  subsidy  amount  and  excess  quantity  supplied.  To 
the  extent  that  farmers  work  their  remaining  land  more 
intensively,  though,  some  subsidy  and  surplus  produc- 
tion  will  remain. 
Target  Prices 
Target  prices  increase  farm  receipts  more  directly. 
In  Figure  lc,  the  government  allows the  market  to clear 
but  pays  the farmer  directly,  by check,  a premium  equal 
to the  difference  between  revenues  at the  target  price 
(P2)  and  revenues  at  the  market  price  (which  is  ex- 
pected  to be  P,).  From  the  farmers’  point  of view,  this 
effectively  shifts  the  demand  curve  up  from  D  to  the 
horizontal  line  at  P1 since  the  target  price  is known  at 
the  beginning  of the  season  when  crops  are  planted. 
From  consumers’  point  of view,  however,  the  market 
demand  curve  is still  D.  If no  attempt  is made  to limit 
output,  quantity  supplied  will increase  to Qz but  market 
price  will  fall  to  P,.  Since  the  target  price  is  still  P1, 
the  cost  of  the  program  to  taxpayers  is  equal  to  the 
increase  in gross  farm  receipts  due  to  the  target  price, 
represented  graphically  by  the  shaded  area.  Output 
reduction  programs  could  attempt  to rotate  the  supply 
curve  to  S,  and  limit  the  subsidy  to  area  a + b.  Since 
output  reductions  are  not  likely  to  be  completely 
effective,  the  amount  transferred  from  taxpayers  to 
farmers  is  likely  to  fall  somewhere  between  the  two 
areas. 
Figure  lc 
and  their  lessened  access  to  credit.  With  lower  ex- 
port  earnings  and  the  need  to  service  debt,  many 
countries  found  themselves  with  less  foreign  ex- 
change  to  purchase  agricultural  goods  abroad.  As a 
result,  world  demand  for agricultural  exports  declined. 
The  United  States,  which  had benefited  in the  1970s 
when  world  trade  expanded,  shouldered  a large  part 
of  the  decrease  when  world  trade  declined. 
The  poor  prospect  for  agricultural  prices  in  the 
1980s  was not recognized  by  those  who  formulated 
farm  policy  in 198 1. The  198 1 Farm  Bill, structured 
in a manner  similar to all agricultural  legislation  since 
the  AAA  of  1933,  increased  price  supports  for  a 
variety  of crops  from  1981  to  1985.  As a result,  the 
gap  between  domestic  price  supports  and  world 
prices  widened,  providing  additional  incentives  for 
American  farmers  to produce  surpluses,  and domestic 
stocks  of  grain  to  accumulate  rapidly. 
At the  same  time,  a number  of producers  who  had 
taken  on long-term  debt  in the  1970s  found  that  the 
price  levels  of  the  early  1980s  provided  them  with 
insufficient  income  to  service  their  debt.  Such 
farmers,  especially  those  who  encountered  drought 
or unforeseen  problems,  experienced  financial  stress 
and  in  some  cases  left  agriculture  through  bank- 
ruptcy,  foreclosure,  or  other  means. 
Striking  parallels  exist  between  the  situation  fac- 
ing American  agriculture  in the  1930s  and the  1980s. 
Today,  as  then,  the  farm  sector  is  experiencing  a 
period  of depressed  farm  prices  resulting  from  stock 
buildups.  In  both  instances  these  stock  buildups 
occurred  after a slump  in foreign  demand.  And finally, 
in  both  cases,  the  basic  farm  policy  approach  is 
similar.  In fact,  many  farm  analysts  believe  that  cur- 
rent  farm  policy  may  have  hampered  adjustment  by 
the  agricultural  sector  to  the  latest  episode  of weak 
demand,  and  thus,  may  have  contributed  to the  cur- 
rent  problems  facing  agriculture. 
THE  1985  FARM  BILL 
The  architects  of  farm  legislation  in  1985  faced 
large  and  increasing  government  holdings  of  com- 
modity  stocks,  widespread  financial  stress  among 
farmers,  and  the  overfarming  of land  and  the  resulting 
depletion  of  land  resources.  Of  course,  there  were 
other  influences.  Tighter  money  and  higher  interest 
rates  often  made  the  rollover  or  expansion  of loans 
more  difficult.  Also  exports  were  affected  adversely 
by the  increased  foreign  exchange  value  of the  dollar 
and trade  barriers  and restrictions  imposed  on United 
States  agricultural  products  by  foreign  countries. 
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goals:  the  support  of farm  income  and  the  reduction 
of  domestic  government-held  grain  stocks.  Their 
secondary  goal was to modify  farm credit  mechanisms 
which  were  facing  financial  problems.  Initially  these 
goals  were  to  be  met  through  programs  that  placed 
greater  reliance  on market  signals to make  agricultural 
policies  effective  for  the  long  term. 
The  policy  tools  chosen  by  Congress,  however, 
turned  out  to be little  different  from  those  employed 
almost  continuously  over  the  past  fifty  years.  The 
Food  Security  Act of 1985 was hardly  a revolutionary 
departure  from  previous  farm  policy,  although  it was 
billed  as  such  during  its  formulation.  Although  the 
Bill eliminated  the  yearly  increases  in support  prices 
in effect  since  1977,  it retained  the  traditional  two- 
tiered  price  support  system  and  otherwise  merely  ex- 
tended  production  limits,  trade  incentives,  and farm 
credit  programs. 
Commodity  Programs 
The  commodity  programs  that  are  the  backbone 
of  the  1985  Farm  Bill,  attempt  to  limit  commodity 
production  by  inducing  farmers  to  voluntarily  con- 
strain  their  production  in a manner  prescribed  by the 
government.  Farmers  who  comply  with  the  con- 
straints  are eligible  to receive  price  supports  or other 
financial  incentives  from  the  federal  government. 
Such  programs  are usually  administered  through  the 
United  States  Department  of  Agriculture  (USDA). 
Crops  Crop  price  support  programs  are intended 
to  supplement  farm  income  and  limit  the  acreage 
planted  in  many  field  crops.  Crops  covered  under 
price  support  programs  include  wheat,  corn, 
sorghum,  barley,  oats,  rye,  rice,  soybeans,  peanuts, 
cotton,  sugar,  and  tobacco. 
For  most  field crops,  the  programs  attempt  to limit 
production  by  reducing  the  program  participant’s 
“base  acreage,”  which  is determined  from  the  number 
of  acres  he  has  historically  devoted  to  the  produc- 
tion  of the  crop.  The  USDA  then  requires  the  par- 
ticipant  to  limit  acres  planted  of  the  crop  to  some 
portion  of  the  base  acreage.  For  peanuts,  tobacco, 
and  rice,  however,  production  control  limits  a par- 
ticipant’s  total  production. 
Price  supports  are  most  often  structured  in  two 
tiers.  The  first  is a nonrecourse  loan  and  the  second 
a deficiency  payment.  The  mechanics  of these  two 
supports  can  be  best  explained  by  example. 
Chart  1 shows  the  market  price,  target  price,  and 
nonrecourse  loan  price  for  corn  from  1981  to  1987. 
At  harvest  each  year,  farmers  may  sell their  crop  at 
the  market  price,  if they  desire.  Farmers  meeting 
USDA’s  production  limitation  requirements  have  a 
second  option,  a nonrecourse  loan,  available.  Those 
who  take  the  loan  must  store  their  crop  as collateral, 
placing  the  crop  in a government-approved  storage 
facility.  Borrowers  are required  to repay  the  loans plus 
interest  at  the  maturity  date  (usually  nine  months 
from  the  date  the  loan  is made)  or  forfeit  the  col- 
lateral  and  keep  the  loan  proceeds.  No  penalty  is 
associated  with the  nonpayment  of nonrecourse  loans 
beyond  collateral  forfeiture. 
The  market  effects  of  nonrecourse  loans  are 
straightforward.  If market  prices  remain  below  loan 
prices,  farmers  will forfeit  their  collateral  and  keep 
the  loan-effectively  selling their  crop  to the  govern- 
ment.  If  market  prices  rise  far  enough  above  loan 
prices  to  cover  the  loan  principal  plus  accrued  in- 
terest,  however,  farmers  will pay off their  nonrecourse 
loans  and  sell their  crops  on  the  open  market.  With 
large  farmer  participation,  loan  programs  may  apply 
to  a significant  portion  of the  available  grain  stocks. 
If so, the  nonrecourse  loan price  which  acts  as a “trig- 
ger” price  at which  farmers  are likely  to redeem  crops 
and  resell  on  the  market,  can  have  a  substantial 
influence  on  the  market  price. 
Total  price  support  compensation  is not  dictated 
so  much  by  the  loan  price  as  by  the  target  price, 
which  is legislated.  When  market  prices  and  basic 
loan prices  fall below  the  target  price,  eligible  farmers 
receive  a deficiency  payment  equal  to the  difference 
between  the  target  price  and  the  market  price  or be- 
tween  the  target  price  and basic loan price,  whichever 
is less.  Payment  can  be  made  in either  cash  or com- 
modity  certificates.  Commodity  certificates  may  be 
used  to  redeem  agricultural  commodities  owned  by 
the  government  or  sold  for  cash. 
Crop  loan prices  were  sharply  reduced  in the  1985 
Farm  Bill. Further,  the  Secretary  of Agriculture  has 
an option  to reduce  loan prices  further  if market  con- 
ditions  dictate.  The  Secretary  has  exercised  this 
option  as  indicated  in  Chart  1 by  the  dotted  line 
labeled  the  announced  loan  price.  Target  prices, 
however,  have  remained  relatively  stable,  being  fixed 
from  1984 to  1987  and projected  to decline  gradually 
thereafter. 
Livestock  Fewer  price  support  programs  are 
available  to  livestock  producers.  The  dairy  industry 
is  the  most  notable  example,  operating  under  a 
marketing  order  program.  Under  the  program,  the 
government  purchases  or  “removes”  excess  dairy 
products  (those  not  consumed  in the  open  market) 
at a set  price.  The  government  price  remains  fixed 
so long as removals  remain  within  a range  determined 
by  the  dairy  program.  If  the  removals  exceed  the 
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government  limit,  dairy  price  supports  fall.  If 
removals  are below  the  limit,  program  provisions  are 
in  place  to  increase  support  price  levels. 
Beef producers  have  effective  price  support  through 
restrictions  on  the  quantity  of  imported  meat  that 
comes  into  the  United  States.  Import  limits  are nor- 
mally exercised  through  voluntary  agreements  among 
major  suppliers.  In addition,  the  federal  government 
adds  to  domestic  demand  through  beef  purchases. 
counter  “unfair”  trade  practices,  to  offset  high 
domestic  price  supports  and unfavorable  movements 
in  the  exchange  value  of  the  dollar,  and  to  expand 
markets.  Promotional  programs,  designed  to provide 
information  to foreign  nations,  are  also provided  for 
under  the  bill. 
Perhaps  the  most  important  policies  to  livestock 
producers  are  the  crop  price  supports.  Since  these 
programs  often  influence  the  price  of grain,  livestock 
producers’  costs  generally  fall when  loan  prices  are 
low  and  rise  as  loan  prices  rise. 
Public  Law  480  is another  conduit  for exports.  This 
law allows a qualifying  nation  to receive  United  States 
food  grain  stocks  and  dairy  products  free  or  at 
favorable  long-term  financing  if the  recipient  qualifies 
under  the  law. 
Food  Stamps 
Export  Incentives 
In  addition  to  commodity  programs,  the  198.5 
Farm  Bill establishes  incentives  for  foreign  nations 
to  purchase  American  farm  commodities  (see  Box 
2).  These  programs  are  intended  to  reduce  surplus 
stocks  by  encouraging  additional  foreign  demand. 
As  a  corollary  to  the  export  subsidies,  the  food 
stamp  program  is aimed  at subsidizing  domestic  con- 
sumption  of  agricultural  products.  This  program, 
along  with  programs  such  as the  school  lunch  pro- 
gram,  however,  has  a relatively  small  effect  on  total 
domestic  demand  for  agricultural  products. 
Credit  Programs 
A primary  incentive  included  in  the  export  pro-  Agricultural  credit  policy  is channeled  through  two 
grams  is providing  credit  assistance  for  foreign  pur-  programs:  the  Farmers  Home  Administration 
chases  of  American  farm  products.  Additionally,  (FmHA),  a government  agency,  and the  Farm  Credit 
stocks  of government-held  grain  and  dairy  products  System  (FCS),  a government-sponsored  agency.  The 
are  to  be  made  available  to  exporters  and  others  to  programs  are  similar  in  that  they  originated  in  the 
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AGRICULTURAL  TRADE  POLICY 
Figure  2a  illustrates  the  mechanics  of  agricultural 
trade.  The  figure  divides  the  world  into  two  parts,  the 
domestic  market  and  the  “rest  of  the  world.”  In  the 
absence  of government  intervention,  at price  “A” the 
quantity  supplied  exceeds  the  quantity  demanded  in 
the  United  States  and  the  quantity  supplied  falls  short 
of that  demanded  in  the  rest  of the  world.  The  world 
market  equilibrium  is reached  when  the  quantity  of ex- 
ports  from  the  United  States  (c -b)  equals  the  quan- 
tity  of  imports  by  the  rest  of  the  world  (e-d). 
Domestic  agricultural  policy  can  negatively  affect the 
position  of United  States  farmers  in world  trade.  In  the 
early  198Os, for instance,  restrictions  on production  and 
domestic  price  supports  pushed  domestic  prices  up and 
lowered  agricultural  exports  from  the  United  States. 
Figure  2b demonstrates  how the  agricultural  trade  posi- 
tion  is  affected  by  domestic  price  support  programs, 
represented  by  price  B. 
At  B,  the  now  larger  domestic  surplus  (c-b) 
exceeds  the  quantity  demanded  by the  rest  of the  world 
(e -d).  The  domestic  surplus  must  be  absorbed  by  the 
United  States  government  if price  B is to be maintained. 
Current  agricultural  trade  policy  attempts  to increase 
the  usage  of American  farm  products  by  encouraging 
foreign  consumption.  The  1985  Farm  Bill provides  a 
number  of incentives  to  nations  wishing  to  buy  farm 
Figure  2a  \ 
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1930s  and  both  are  charged  with  making  loanable 
funds  available  to  the  agricultural  sector.  Their 
specific  areas  of responsibility  and  methods  used  to 
achieve  their  objectives  differ  in  many  respects, 
however. 
FmHA  initially  provided  credit  to  small  farmers 
to help  them  adjust  to  economic  changes.  Under  this 
proposal,  those  receiving  credit  were  normally  poor 
credit  risks.  In  recent  years,  FmHA  credit  has  in- 
creasingly  been  made  available  to larger farmers.  Still, 
many  borrowers  remain  poor  credit  risks,  and FmHA 
loans  usually  carry  more  favorable  terms  than  com- 
mercial  alternatives. 
FCS  is  a  member-owned  cooperative  system 
consisting  of  twelve  regional  banks  with  numerous 
branches.  The  FCS  seeks  creditworthy  farm  bor- 
rowers  for  a variety  of loan  terms.  The  system  has 
three  lending  arms.  The  Federal  Land  Banks  make 
long-term  loans  usually  collateralized  by  real  estate. 
The  Federal  Intermediate  Credit  Banks  and  Produc 
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effective  cost  of  these  commodities  on  the  world 
market. 
Trade  incentives  can  take  many  forms.  Credit  con- 
cessions,  in-kind  commodities,  subsidized  prices,  and 
other  types  of export  enhancement  programs  effectively 
lower  the  price  of U.S.  farm  commodities  to  foreign 
buyers.  The  lower  export  price  could  expand  the 
United  States’  share  of the  world  market  if other  na- 
tions  do not  offset  our  actions.  In  Figure  Zb,  an export 
subsidy  program  might  try  to  lower  the  export  price 
to  C  overseas  while  the  domestic  price  is maintained 
at  B.  If at  price  C  the  quantity  demanded  for  import 
(i -h)  by  the  rest  of  the  world  exceeds  the  quantity 
available  for  export  from  current  production  in  the 
United  States  at  price  B  (c -b),  the  difference  must 
come  from  a  drawdown  of  U.S.  surplus  stocks. 
Ideally,  such  a drawdown  should  eventually  place  up- 
ward  pressure  on  domestic  U.S.  commodity  prices. 
Two  problems  arise  with  this  approach.  First,  the 
reduction  of  stocks  is costly.  Subsidies  can  push  the 
export  price  below  the  cost  of production,  leaving  the 
taxpayer  to fund  the  difference.  Second,  if foreign  na- 
tions  match  United  States  export  prices  due  to  sub- 
sidy  or comparative  advantage,  the  programs  may  not 
result  in  increased  market  share.  The  drawdown  of 
stocks,  then,  might  not  occur  as  expected. 
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tion  Credit  Associations  provide  short-  and 
intermediate-term  credit.  The  Central  Bank  for 
Cooperatives  provides  loans  to farmer  cooperatives. 
FCS  raises  funds  through  the  issuance  of bonds  and 
lends  the  proceeds  to  the  agricultural  sector. 
The  economic  difficulties  of  agriculture  over  the 
past  few years  have  contributed  to weak  earnings  for 
the  FCS.  In  1985  Congress  put  in  place  a federal 
line  of  credit  that  may  be  used  to  cover  temporary 
liquidity  problems  of the  FCS  should  the  need  arise. 
THE  COST OF FARM  POLICY 
Farm  policy  affects  domestic  farmers,  consumers, 
foreign  policymakers,  and  others.  When  policy 
changes,  these  groups  benefit  and  lose  to  different 
extents.  As  a result,  it  is difficult  to  fully  measure 
the  net  welfare  effects  of  farm  policy. 
A relatively  simple  method  by  which  part  of  the 
cost  of farm  policy  may  be  measured  is to  examine 
the  annual  budget  USDA  devotes  to  direct 
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promotions.  In  the  early  198Os,  the  direct  budget 
costs  (those  borne  directly  by  the  taxpayer)  totaled 
$3  billion  to  $5  billion  per  year.  In  1987,  the  cost 
is projected  to reach  about  $30  billion,  or about  $700 
for  every  nonfarm  family  in  the  United  States. 
The  cost  of  farm  policy  is thus  of  great  concern 
to Congress,  taxpaying  households,  and farmers.  The 
high  cost  impedes  Congressional  efforts  to  reduce 
the  federal  budget  deficits.  Households,  who  bear 
the  cost  of farm  policy,  are  questioning  this  wealth 
transfer  with  a more  critical  eye.  Farmers  themselves 
are divided  over  the  effectiveness  of the  farm policies. 
Certain  farmers  have  come  to believe  that  the policies 
allow  inefficient  producers  to  remain  in  agriculture 
and  they  argue  that  too  many  farmers  contribute  to 
the  problem  of mounting  agricultural  surpluses.  Many 
farmers  also  express  concern  that  their  incomes 
depend  increasingly  on  federal  dollars.  With  25 
percent  of farm  net  cash  income  coming  from  direct 
government  payments  in  1986,  recipients  fear  that 
shifts in agricultural  policy  could  result  in sharp reduc- 
tions  in  farm  income. 
Chart  2 
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THE  EFFECTIVENESS  OF FARM  POLICY 
As noted  earlier,  the  primary  goals  of agricultural 
policy  are  to  reduce  the  accumulation  of  surplus 
stocks  of farm  commodities  and  to  support  farm  in- 
come.  The  success  of policy  in accomplishing  these 
objectives  is  open  to  question. 
Commodity  Stocks 
As shown  by Chart  2, carryover  stocks  have  been 
rising  in recent  years  despite  acreage  reduction  pro- 
grams.  The  increases  have  occurred  because 
agricultural  production  levels  have  been  maintained 
while  exports  have  fallen  sharply. 
prices.  Export  sales  of  wheat  and  corn  concluded 
early  this  year  coupled  with  the  likelihood  of  re- 
duced  plantings  may  be  sufficient  to  slow  further 
stock  accumulations  in  1987.  However,  these 
developments  do  not  appear  sufficient  enough  to 
reduce  current  stock  surpluses.  Because  surplus  grain 
stocks  have  not  yet  been  lessened,  policy  has  to  be 
judged  deficient  in  this  area. 
Income  Supports 
Domestic  grain  production  has  remained  at 
relatively  high  levels  because  set-aside  acreage  has 
often  been  offset  by  increased  yields.  For  example, 
thirteen  million  acres  of corn  were  set  aside  in  1986, 
but  total  production  was  8.2  billion  bushels,  the 
second  highest  harvest  ever.  Weak  corn  exports  com- 
pounded  the  problem  of  large  production,  leaving 
ending  stocks  at  5.7  billion  bushels,  far  above  the 
previous  record  of 4 billion bushels  set in 1985.  Other 
major  crops  show  a  similar,  though  often  not  as 
dramatic,  pattern. 
A second  major  goal  of the  1985  Farm  Bill is the 
support  of  farm  income.  As  can  be  observed  from 
the  table,  farm  cash  receipts  from  marketings  de- 
clined  sharply  in  1986  and  are expected  to decrease 
further  this  year.  The  decrease  comes  entirely  out 
of  crop  cash  receipts  as livestock  cash  receipts  are 
actually  increasing  over  the  period. 
This  pattern  is  influenced  by  the  price  support 
mechanisms.  Crop  cash  receipts  are  based  on  sales 
at  the  prevailing  market  price  or  government  loan 
price.  Since  market  prices  and loan prices  fell sharply, 
it  is not  surprising  that  crop  cash  receipts  also  fell. 
Despite  the  policy’s  current  emphasis  on exports,  Farm  income  has  been  supported,  however, 
both  the  volume  and  value  of  commodities  sold  despite  the  decline  in cash  receipts.  As noted  earlier, 
abroad  have  fallen  in  recent  years.  Reasons  ad-  farmers’  total  price  support  compensation  includes 
vanced  for the  declines  include  increased  production  deficiency  payments  and  the  loan  price.  It was  also 
abroad,  unfair  trade  policies,  and  high  domestic  pointed  out  that  deficiency  payments  grow when  loan 
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Item  1983  1984  1985  1986P  1987F 
1. 
2. 
3.  Total  gross  farm  income  152.4  174.4  166.6  158  154-156 
4.  Gross  cash  income  150.2  154.9  156.2  151  146-148 
5.  Nonmoney  income  13.2  13.3  11.5  10  8-10 
6.  Value  of  inventory  change  -  10.9  6.3  -  1.1  -3  -4-o 
7.  Cash  expenses  113.0  115.6  112.1  102  96-98 
8.  Total  expenses  139.5  141.7  136.1  125  119-121 
9. 
10. 
11.  Off-farm  income  37.0  37.9  40.8  43  43-45 
12.  Loan  changes:  Real  estate  2.5  -0.8  -5.6  -8  (-81-l-4) 
13.  Nonreal  estate  1.0  -0.8  -9.2  -10  (-  91-t -  5) 
14.  Rental  income  plus  monetary  chng. 
15.  Capital  expenditures 
16.  Net  cash  flow 
Farm  receipts 
Crops  (incl  net  CCC  loans) 
Livestock 
Farm  related 
Direct  Government  payments  9.3  8.4  7.7  12  15-17 
Cash  payments  4.1  4.0  7.6  8  7-9 
Value  of  PIK  commodities  5.2  4.5  0.1  4  7-9 
Net  cash  income  37.1  39.3  44.0  49  48-52 
Net  farm  income  13.0  32.7  30.5  33  33-37 
Deflated  (1982!$)  12.5  30.3  27.3  29  27-30 
P-preliminary.  F-forecast. 
Source:  U.S.  Department  of Agriculture 
Billion dollars 
140.9  146.4  148.5  139  131-133 
67.0  69.2  72.7  63  54-56 
69.5  72.9  69.4  71  71-73 




7.8  8.0  17  5-7 
12.5  10.1  8  6-8 
33.0  27.1  30  34-38 
-  -  - 
prices  drop  and  target  prices  remain  relatively  un- 
changed.  The  effect  of bigger  deficiency  payments 
can be  seen  in line  2 of the  table,  direct  government 
payments.  Between  1985  and  1987  (projected), 
direct  government  payments  almost  doubled,  from 
$7.7  billion  to  $15  billion. 
The  effect  of higher  direct  government  payments 
and  lower  costs  of production  has  meant  higher  in- 
come  levels  to  farmers  (lines  9 and  10).  It  appears, 
therefore,  that  income  is being  maintained  by higher 
government  payments  and  not  by  a greater  reliance 
on market  forces  as early  architects  of the  198.5 Farm 
Bill had  hoped. 
WHERE  DO  WE  GO  FROM  HERE? 
Aware  of the  high costs  of current  farm  policy  and 
concerned  about  the  impacts  of policy  on agricultural 
problems,  Congress  is expected  to focus  a great  deal 
of attention  on farm policy  later this year.  Policy  areas 
to  be  considered  will  likely  include  those  denoted 
by  the  terms  decouphng,  targeting,  trade  negotiation, 
and  resource conservation. 
Decoupling refers  to  the  elimination  of the  linkage 
between  farm income  programs  and commodity  pro- 
duction.  Present  programs  require  the  removal  of 
cropland  but  provide  income  based  directly  or 
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are  thus  encouraged  to  strive  for  higher  yields  on 
fewer  acres  and,  in the  process,  may  counteract  the 
program’s  intended  goal  of  reducing  production. 
Under  decoupling,  the  government  would  make 
direct  cash  payments  to farmers  to  support  their  in- 
comes,  but the  payments  would  be disassociated  from 
production.  Therefore  the  market  would  determine 
supply  and  demand  of commodities.  Surplus  stocks 
should  not  occur  under  such  a  system. 
Taqethg  refers  to an identification  mechanism  that 
would  replace  production  as  a  means  of  deter- 
mining  the  distribution  of government  payments  to 
farmers.  Under  targeting,  criteria  would  be  developed 
to  determine  the  eligibility  for  and  amount  of 
payments  to particular  farmers.  This  procedure  would 
allow  the  government  to  encourage  or  discourage 
specific  activities  within  agriculture. 
Trade  negotiation  would  attempt  to  dismantle, 
through  international  cooperation,  protection  in the 
global  marketplace.  Nations  that  reduce  agricultural 
trade  subsidies  often  lose  their  markets  to  other 
nations  that  continue  subsidies.  Only  through  inter- 
national  cooperation  can these  subsidies  be eliminated 
and  world  prices  be  adjusted  to  reflect  true  market 
prices. 
Resource conservation programs  would  encourage  the 
removal  of erodible  and dry farmland  which  has been 
brought  into  agricultural  production  due  to high com- 
modity  price  supports.  Farmers  would  be paid  “rent” 
by  the  government  to  remove  eligible  land  over  a 
long-term  basis,  usually  ten  years.  USDA  is aware 
that  the  concurrent  offers  of price  supports  and retire- 
ment  of land may  place  managers  of government  pro- 
grams  in  a  position  where  they  bid  against 
themselves.  Congress  must  consider  a solution  to this 
problem  in  its  debates on  resource  conservation 
programs. 
CONCLUSION 
The  present  structure  of  agricultural  policy  grew 
out  of  programs  implemented  during  the  1930s. 
These  programs  may  be  inappropriate  now.  If  so, 
current  policy  may  be ineffective  in solving  problems 
facing  the  agricultural  sector.  Policy  costs  have 
soared,  yet  primary  goals  remain  only  partially  met. 
With  this  in  mind,  Congress  will  likely  consider 
modifications  that  may  divert  domestic  agricultural 
policy  from  the  traditional  path  it  has  followed. 
Congressional  modifications  of  the  type  dis- 
cussed  in this  article  will  likely  add  to  the  expense 
of farm  programs  in the  short  run.  If, however,  they 
achieve  the  desired  results,  namely  a reduction  in 
surplus  stocks  and maintenance  of farm  income,  they 
may  prove  to  be  a bargain  in  the  long  run. 
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